Against a normative view of folk psychology by Meredith R. Wilkinson
OPINION ARTICLE
published: 16 June 2014
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00598
Against a normative view of folk psychology
Meredith R. Wilkinson*
Division of Psychology, Faculty of Health and Life Sciences, School of Applied Social Sciences, De Montfort University, Leicester, UK
*Correspondence: mwilkinson@dmu.ac.uk
Edited by:
David E. Over, Durham University, UK
Reviewed by:
Linden John Ball, University of Central Lancashire, UK
Keywords: folk psychology, normative, reasoning, descriptive, theory theory, simulation theory
Recently Elqayam and Evans (2011) have
proposed that researchers studying human
thinking should be moving away from
normative accounts that specify how we
“ought” to reason to a more descriptivist
framework that describes how we reason.
This is an approach that I very much sup-
port. The aim of the present article is to
demonstrate how this can be applied to the
study of mental state reasoning in terms
of folk psychology (FP). Folk psychology
refers to our everyday ability to attribute
mental states to other people, including
their beliefs, desires, intentions and so
forth (e.g., Ratcliffe and Hutto, 2007). I
do not want to deny that FP can be nor-
mative. Indeed, there are many instances
where normative responding is required.
For example, in the traditional false belief
task (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) there
is a “right” or “wrong” answer - a sin-
gle norm paradigm (Elqayam and Evans,
2011). However, it may be the case that
FP is normative in certain circumstances
(e.g., the false belief task) but as I shall sug-
gest below this is not always the case. By
viewing FP as normative what researchers
end up doing is ignoring the processes of
how such inferences arise. What I want
to propose is that viewing FP as nor-
mative is problematic since it reduces
mental state inferences to simply being
“right” or “wrong.” I propose that moving
away from a normative agenda in FP and
embracing a more descriptivist framework
proves extremely useful for our under-
standing of how we understand others’
minds.
FOLK PSYCHOLOGY AS A NORMATIVE
FRAMEWORK
One factor that philosophers have pro-
posed regarding FP is that it is normative
in nature. One of the earliest claims of this
was made by Dennett (1989) who argued:
“Folk psychology, then, is idealized in
that it produces its predictions and expla-
nations by calculating in a normative sys-
tem; it predicts what we will believe, desire,
and do, by determining what we ought
to believe, desire, and do” (Dennett, 1989
p. 52).
Dennett (1989) views FP as a form
of mindreading but has the perspective
of the intentional stance. His perspective
appears to be normative in nature speci-
fying both a normative framework and an
ought stance. This sense of normativism in
FP extends to recent literature:
“Even on the standard view, then,
folk psychology is not just an explana-
tory/predictive practice, it is also, in a
sense, a normative practice: a practice of
showing how people’s performances lives
up to certain norms and thereby become,
in that special way, intelligible. Although
folk psychologists may have some context-
specific views about what others will
do—based, for instance, on experience—
the bulk of these views will be heavily
influenced by norm-governed judgments
about what others ought to do, what it
makes sense to do in the circumstances”
(McGeer, 2007, p. 141).
The above quotation appears to be
arguing that we can in our FP responses
generate normative responses. Just as we
have a normative rule that when driving
you should stop at a red light, what is being
implied here is that we have a sense of what
people “ought” to do in certain situations.
Viewing FP in a normative framework is a
view that exists till the present day:
“Whatever focus one adopts, judg-
ments of the rational or scientific status of
elements in folk psychology are inevitably
normative judgments, based on compar-
isons between what ordinary folk do
with some prescriptive scientific account”
(Fletcher, 1995, pp. 43–44).
Such a perspective sees FP as confirm-
ing to rationality and having an analogy
with science. However, if FP is to have an
analogy with science then we may to some
degree want to subject it to empirical test-
ing. However, Churchland (1991) argues
that empirical testing may do little for FP:
“Folk psychology, insist others is radi-
cally unlike the examples cited. It does not
consist of laws. It does not support causal
explanations. It does not evolve over time.
Its central purpose is normative rather
than descriptive. And thus, it is not the
sort of framework that might be shown to
be radically defective by sheerly empirical
findings” (Churchland, 1991, p. 51).
I think that this quote is somewhat
problematic as FP does support causal
explanations and it has evolved over time.
For example, the use of neuroscience to
examine FP (e.g., Ruby and Decety, 2001).
I hope to have demonstrated in this section
how multiple theorists view FP as norma-
tive and now aim to demonstrate what is
problematic about doing so.
WHAT IS PROBLEMATIC ABOUT
VIEWING FOLK PSYCHOLOGY AS
NORMATIVE?
Whilst I accept that there is normative
responding in FP, for example, it is nor-
mative to assume that if we push someone
off a seat on the bus so that we can sit
down then they will be angry I believe
that viewing FP as normative is problem-
atic since it reduces mental state reasoning
to “right” or “wrong” answers and indeed
a “right” way to reason (as indicated by
the quotations above). Admittedly, FP is
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a single norm paradigm (Elqayam and
Evans, 2011) so does not face the difficulty
that reasoning research does of having
multiple normative accounts to arbitrate
between.
I agree with Elqayam and Evans (2011)
when they claim that normativism has
biased the study of thinking and feel that
this can be applied to the study of FP. FP
has repeatedly made use of tasks of false
belief in order to examine mentalizing. I
believe that this is problematic since it has
led to a very restricted range of tasks being
studied. If we were to move away from
a normative perspective of FP then this
would open many more doors to examine
mentalizing since far too much attention,
from my perspective, has been focused on
the false belief paradigm. Thus, what is
happening here is that people are either
attributed with having a capacity to engage
in FP reasoning or not. I believe that this
is problematic since there is much more
to FP then the false belief task and much
more to the false belief task than FP under-
standing (Bloom and German, 2000). I
demonstrate within the next section how
a descriptivist study of FP may work.
A final problem with viewing FP as
normative is that although there are clear
cut cases, as in the false belief task, where
there is a “right” and “wrong” answer in
tasks of mental state reasoning this isn’t
always going to be the case. I believe that
if something is to be fully normative then
it should always be the case that there is
a right and wrong response. For example,
if we are informed by our friend that her
boyfriend has ended their relationship we
may assume that she will be devastated.
However, other factors may influence that
judgment such as if she wanted to separate
with him then you may believe that she
will be relieved. However, it is still possible
that she will be upset as he separated with
her first. What I aim to demonstrate here is
that there is not always a clear cut answer
with FP and therefore we should embrace
a more descriptive framework rather than
a normative one.
WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES OF A
DESCRIPTIVIST ACCOUNT?
I have argued that viewing FP as nor-
mative can be severely problematic. I am
not the only theorist who takes this view.
Andrews (2012) argues that “the study of
folk psychology is a descriptive endeavor,
as opposed to a normative one.” (Andrews,
2012, p. 251). Thus, what we should be
aiming to do as researchers is not provide
an account of how people ought to rea-
son but provide an account of how they
do reason using appropriate theories and
experimental methodologies.
A recent descriptivist approach to FP
comes from Wilkinson and Ball (2013)
who provide a dual-process perspective
to theorizing and simulation. I draw the
link to the theorizing vs. simulation the-
ory debate here since it is the ideal type
of question that those who study FP
should be asking in terms of the cogni-
tive processes which underlie FP, I am
not saying that the term FP necessar-
ily refers to the theorizing vs. simula-
tion debate itself. Theorizing refers to
understanding mental states via the adop-
tion of theories which link mental states,
behavior and the environment together
(e.g., Carruthers, 1996). Whereas simula-
tion proposes that we reason about oth-
ers’ mental states via controlled processes
of simulation either from a third-person
(e.g., Goldman, 2006) or first-person (e.g.,
Gordon, 1986) perspective. According to
Wilkinson and Ball theorizing is viewed as
synonymous with intuitive reasoning and
simulation is viewed as synonymous with
reflective reasoning within a dual-process
framework (e.g., Evans, 2010). As such,
theorizing can be viewed as possessing
the characteristics of being fast, automatic,
low effort, high capacity and independent
of working memory resources whereas
simulation is slow, controlled, high effort,
low capacity and dependent upon working
memory resources.
According toWilkinson and Ball (2013)
people can either choose to theorize or
simulate. It is possible for them to engage
in both with people skipping between the-
orizing and simulation and vice versa. This
reflects the hybrid nature of theorizing and
simulation (see also Mitchell et al., 2009).
Wilkinson and Ball note that conflict may
arise between the responses generated by
theorizing and simulation and this can be
overcome with a conflict resolution mech-
anism which is analogous to Evans’ (2009)
type 3 reasoning. Conflict does not have to
arise though and one response may just be
generated. The advantage of viewing FP in
this manner is that it promotes a program
of research which focuses on the ques-
tion of ‘how’ people reason and not just
how they ought to reason. It further avoids
the tricky issue of rationality, something
which in mental state reasoning would
be very difficult to examine since what
is rational for one agent is not necessar-
ily rational for another. I believe that this
addresses the issue raised above regarding
how viewing FP as normative has led to a
bias in how it is studied. Wilkinson et al.
(2010) used think aloud protocols where
they asked participants to think aloud
whilst working through regret-orientated
counterfactual scenarios and then coding
participants’ verbalizations for instances of
theorizing and simulation. Adopting this
method enabled Wilkinson et al. (2010).
To gain a measure of how people reason
which gives a much richer insight than
whether someone answered correctly or
incorrectly.
Wilkinson and Ball (2013) are not the
only researchers to link FP to dual-process
theories. Bohl and van den Bos (2012) pro-
pose that theory of mind requires reflective
reasoning whereas interactionism requires
intuitive reasoning. Whilst their account
differs from Wilkinson and Ball since they
propose that theory of mind consists of
both intuitive and reflective processes both
demonstrate a move toward viewing men-
tal state reasoning in dual-process terms
(see also Apperly and Butterfill, 2009).
I, like Andrews (2012), believe that FP
is descriptive rather than normative in
nature and Andrews aims to develop an
account which is more descriptively accu-
rate than normative. It is only via view-
ing FP as descriptive can real progress
be made into examining the complexi-
ties of our abilities to engage in mental
state reasoning of both ourselves and other
people. Within the reasoning literature
some authors endorse a “soft norma-
tivsm” perspective (e.g., Stupple and Ball,
2011) whereby they propose that norma-
tive constructs can feed into a descriptivist
framework. To some degree I endorse this
perspective since there are normative rules
which govern how we expect others to feel.
However, I do believe that the descriptivist
framework of Wilkinson and Ball (2013)
enables a much richer account of the cog-
nitive processes in mental state reason-
ing than any normative only perspective
permits.
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